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More than seven years of international presence in post-war Bosnia have still not brought
lasting stability to the country. Surveys suggest that a substantial share of the population
continue to oppose Bosnia in its current form, further evidenced by the continuing electoral
success of nationalist parties. These difficulties solicit an evaluation of some of the inherent
difficulties of international intervention in a post-conflict setting such as Bosnia. This article
will thus examine the symptoms of dependency resulting from international intervention on the
political scene and civil society. The key argument forwarded herein is that the overly inter-
ventionist approach might have lead to a host of decisions and laws which might be commend-
able for the country, but that this intervention simultaneously disempowered Bosnian actors.
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1. Introduction
The more than seven years of post-war peace
building in Bosnia provides observers with rich ma-
terial in different approaches to conflict management
and development aid. The degree of international
involvement, both in terms of political involvement
and in terms of financial investment, has made Bosnia
a laboratory of Western experimentation in post-con-
flict reconstruction of deeply divided societies.
Throughout the post-war years, a number of differ-
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ent approaches have been chosen. In fact, over time
the degree of intervention on behalf of international
agencies increased, while the overall amount of in-
ternational financial support for Bosnia decreased.
The lessons of Bosnia are not only applicable
to other post-conflict settings in former Yugoslavia,
such as Kosovo and Macedonia, but have also rel-
evance for an increasing number of cases of interna-
tionally administered/assisted territories and coun-
tries around the world, emerging from severe inter-
nal conflict, ranging from East Timor to Afghani-
stan.
In this article, we will examine the develop-
ment of post-war international intervention, followed
by an analysis of the factors of aid dependency in
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the political sphere and in civil society. Aid depend-
ency here shall not be limited to mere financial de-
pendency, as the term originally suggests, but rather
the dependency resulting from political intervention.
This type of intervention can be conceived as a form
of 'aid', if not financially, it is aimed at stabilizing
the country and building an effective, democratic and
pluralist state and society.
2. Dayton as Ceasefire
While the General Framework for Peace, con-
cluded in November 1995 in Dayton (Ohio) and
signed the following month in Paris, extended be-
yond peace agreement in its scope by prescribing
the post-war constitutional order of the agreement,
its early implementation record did not reflect the
breadth of the agreement. The effectiveness of the
substantial international involvement in terms of
military presence and investment in the initial phase
was watered-down by the reluctance to intervene
against the nationalist agitation of the dominant three
nationalist parties and their stranglehold on the eco-
nomic resources through corruption and nepotism.
This reluctance was informed by two assumptions:
a) Confronting nationalist parties is danger-
ous and might jeopardize peacekeepers. If Western
peacekeepers are under threat, support in the West
for the mission might disappear, leading to a hasty
withdrawal.
b) The population has been manipulated by
the nationalist elites and will chose more moderate
political leaders in_elections, as long as these are free
and fair.
Both assumptions emerged as being flawed.
Despite a number of smaller incidents, the national-
ist parties did not threaten the international presence,
even later as it became more assertive as it started
arresting indicted war criminals. On the other hand,
the first elections held only 9 months after the com-
ing into force of the peace accords in September
1996, consolidated and thus legitimized the rule of
the three nationalist parties. While the result can be
explained in part by the absence offree and fair con-
ditions during and before the elections, the causes
lie with the fact that a majority of the population
actually did support the nationalist parties. The preva-
lence of nationalist sentiment continued to shape
electoral choices of the population.
During this first phase, lasting from Decem-
ber 1995 until December 1997, when the Office of
the High Representative (OHR), the international
organization charged with overseeing the civilian
aspects of the implementations, the implementation
of the peace accord restricted itself to Annex 1 A,
i.e. the establishment of a cease- fire. The reluctance
of IFORISFOR to act in areas outside the narrow
military implementation process and the lack of
power given to the civilian agencies meant that joint
institutions existed only pro forma, freedom of move-
ment across the inter-entity boundary was strictly
limited and the parallel power-structures of the three
nationalist parties remained largely undisturbed.
3. Governance
without Participation
While the first phase of the implementation
of the Dayton Peace Accords could be described as
a ceasefire, the approach of the international com-
munity became more interventionist in 199711998
when it became visible that nationalist parties are
not voted out of office. The re-integration of the
state was considered unattainable as long as (a) war
criminals were not arrested and (b) any decision to
strengthen institutions of the state was blocked or
vetoed by one or more of the three dominant nation-
alist parties.
This new approach was exemplified by the so-
called Bonn powers wherein the weak competences
of the High Representative were substantially aug-
mented; allowing the OHR to pass laws and deci-
sions and to dismiss elected and appointed officials.
Since this increase in power of the High Representa-
tive, the office has passed over 100 laws and deci-
sions-ranging from the state symbols and license
plates to pension funds-and dismissed over 60 pub-
lic officials from office, including a president of the
Republika Srpska and the Croat representative of the
Bosnian Presidency. Resulting from this develop-
ment, Bosnia has gained some attributes of a protec-
torate since 1997. This followed suggestions of a
number of Bosnian intellectuals and international
policy centers, such as the International Crisis Group,
who advocated increased international intervention
and a protectorate to reduce the role of the national-
ist parties. The most tangible success of the High
Representative's increased role has been the passing
of significant legislation that would have either beel;
postponed indefinitely or been watered down. The
dismissal of public officials could also be interpreted
as a success. The case has been made, however, that
the successful outcomes notwithstanding, the proc-
ess in fact hurt the development of democracy in
Bosnia. As Marcus Cox details, the High Representa-
tive's decisions relieve the participants in the power-
sharing structures from negations and compromises,
effectively reducing their responsibilities and allow-
ing nationalist politicians to advocate uncompromis-
ing positions without the fear of being blamed if no
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compromise is found. As a result, "nationalist poli-
ticians have often welcomed the High Representa-
tive's interventions, which relieve them of the re-
sponsibility for difficult political positions." The in-
stitutions in Bosnia, in addition to their original weak-
nesses, have been further weakened by the strength-
ening of international organizations in the country.
It is nevertheless important to note that the repre-
sentatives of the three nationalist parties demon-
strated little willingness to engage in serious nego-
tiations even before the enhancement of the HR's
role.
Within the different layers of governance, in-
ternational representation is also interlinked with
Bosnian state institutions themselves. The Constitu-
tional Court, the Human Rights Chamber and the
Central Bank incorporate significant international
participation. The international judges and Gover-
nor of the Central Bank are not representatives of
international organizations, but merely appointed by
them (the European Court of Human Rights, the
Council of Europe and the IMF respectively). As
such, they become "Bosnian" actors, with the pri-
mary advantage of not being a member of the three
national groups and thus resembling a neutral arbi-
ter and mediator within these institutions. The in-
clusion of international members into domestic in-
stitutions brings the advantage of not having to by-
pass domestic institutions to take decisions. In addi-
tion, the process of inter-ethnic negations is only
slightly impaired.
In May 2000 non-nationalist parties for the
first time since the introduction of multi-party de-
mocracy in Bosnia could make significant gains at
the expense of the three nationalist parties. Although
the November 2000 elections did not bring about a
significant shift of public opinion away from the
nationalist parties, with the exception of Bosniak
dominated part of the country, it provided an elec-
tion result which enabled a fragile coalition of mul-
tinational and moderately nationalist parties to take
over from the 'big three' in the Federation and the
state institutions. While the record of the new gov-
ernment has been mixed, it provided the international
community with a local interlocutor in the imple-
mentation process. The emergence of local partner
coincided with a shift of the international communi-
ties' policy, which recognized the need to strengthen
the state institutions. A number of individual events,
such as key Constitution Court decision, the change
of regime in Croatia and Yugoslavia, as well as the
isolation of Croat extremists with the HDZ due to
the proclamation of Croat self-government in March
2001, furthered the demise of parallel power struc-
tures.
The role of the international community as
'governors' of Bosnia remains significant neverthe-
less. This was evidenced in April 2002 as the High
Representative decreed constitutional changes in
both entities to bring them in line with the Constitu-
tional Court decision of July 2000. The decree was
deemed necessary, as the proposals agreed upon by
the moderate parties did not muster sufficient sup-
port in the parliaments of both entities. The previ-
ous High Representative Wolfang Petritsch justified
these amendments as being based at least partly on
the consent of the parties: "This is not an outright
imposition as used to be the case in old times. This
is clearly a new approach, I would say - this is a
partnership." Petritsch's comment highlights the dif-
ficulty of the Western community with imposing fun-
damentallaws in a country where it seeks to simul-
taneously further democracy. Whereas international
actors, including Wolfgang Petritsch are aware of
this dependency trap, it has proven hard to escape
the dynamics of benign Western intervention.
4. Foreign Civil Society
and Foreign Aid
Another type of dependency is best exempli-
fied when examining the non-governmental sector
in Bosnia, which has received substantial western
aid over the post-war year in an attempt to strengthen
'civil society' and subsequently non-nationalist al-
ternatives to the dominant political parties. Despite
considerable efforts, the position of the non-govern-
mental sector in Bosnia remains very weak even six
years after the end of the war. While some of the
weaknesses can be attributed to region-wide phenom-
ena, such as a lack of tradition of volunteerism and
economic hardships, some are Bosnia-specific. The
war and its effect on the social structure and Bosnia
as a whole has rendered the development of the NGO
sector more difficult. The ethnic divisions in the
country, as well as its territorial expression through
the creation of the two entities, have presented itself
as a further hurdle for non-governmental organiza-
tions.
Finally, the case can be made that international
intervention into all political spheres and the large
international presence effectively reduced the poten-
tial of local grass roots NGOs. There are two main
reasons for this phenomena: (1) The international
organizations with their need to staff their organiza-
tions hired many citizens who would have otherwise
become active in the Civil Society, especially those
with higher education and language skills. (2) There
has been a dependency trap, which created numer-
ous initiatives based on the assessments of Western
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donors and less on local needs. Frequent changes in
Western priorities in the country, the 'discovery' of
new topics of interest which push previous ones in
the background, has had a negative impact on the
long-term development oflocal capacities and struc-
tures.
The funding, mostly originating from govern-
mental sources in North America and Western Eu-
rope, as well as also from some private sources, most
importantly from George Soros through the local
Open Society Foundation, has been significant and
yet frequently uncoordinated and directed towards
short-term projects. Frequently, NGOs are de-facto
'commissioned' to carry out the Western donors
policy priorities and have little room to develop their
own priorities, being largely reduced to 'service pro-
vision.' The reduction of international funding in
Bosnia might further weaken NGOs.
The outcome of most support for civil society
in Bosnia by the international donor community has
been largely dismal. Despite considerable resources
invested, the long-term impact is likely to be lim-
ited. Not only do the priorities of the donors change
too frequently, but also there are also insufficient
quality controls of the work of the local NGOs and
few attempts have been made to establish a link of
accountability between NGOs and the citizens of
Bosnia. As a result many citizens see NGOs either
as irrelevant for their lives or merely as a possible
job opportunity. In addition, a large number ofNGOs
suffer from a credibility gap, as NGOs are bound by
the need to direct their attention more at international
donors and less at their local constituencies.
S. Conclusions
As detailed above, the political sphere and civil
society-as a mediator between the political sphere
and society-have been dominated by the interna-
tional community. While this intervention has been
motivated by an attempt to undermine the national-
ist groups that were responsible for the war, it actu-
ally reinforced some key phenomena, which can be
identified as root causes of the conflict:
- Lack of responsibility and accountability of
the political elite. The political elite is accountable
to the international actors, but less to domestic audi-
ences. The fact that decisions are taken irrespective
of the political elites rhetoric by the international
community short-circuits classical accountability. In
addition, the international actors themselves are ac-
countable to international organizations, but not to
the Bosnian population.
- Complexity of the decision making process-
the dispersion of power. The decision making proc-
ess in Bosnia is nontransparent and complex that even
most observers cannot easily identify the location of
power. This is in part the result of the complex struc-
ture of the countries institutions and partly resulting
from the existence of parallel power structures. In
combination, these mirror the complexity of the so-
cialist system of self-governance which facilitated
the rise of nationalist parties on the premises of re-
ducing complexity by relating directly to their re-
spective ethnic groups.
- Over-institutionalizing Ethnicity. The inter-
national organizations have, while opposing extrem-
ist parties, continued to emphasize ethnicity in both
the institutions and informal arrangements. Remi-
niscent of the communist rule, when the 'ethnic key'
was of paramount importance, ethnicity permeates
all institutions and spheres of governance. The em-
phasis on ethnicity tends to render the emergence of
more integrative concepts difficult to take hold.
- Creating Dependencies. In civil society and
in politics, as well as in the economic development
of Bosnia, dependencies on the international actors
have been created which limit the development of a
democratic culture and render a transfer to complete
self-rule more difficult.
While most observers of the peace process
would agree that there has been some degree of im-
provement in terms of implementation and 'normali-
zation' in recent years, most structural problems re-
main. The acceptance of the state by two of its con-
stituent nations, namely Croats and Serbs remains
very low. In December 2000, shortly after the elec-
tions, which for the first time gave a (slight) major-
ity to non-nationalist and moderate parties in Bosnia,
a majority of Croats and Serbs opposed Bosnian state-
hood. Among those surveyed in Republika Srpska
60.8 percent supported either the entity as an inde-
pendent state or its accession to the Federal Repub-
lic Yugoslavia. In majority Croat areas of the Fed-
eration, the support for joining Croatia stood at 4.4
percent, while 37.6 percent favored the creation ofa
separate territorial unit within or outside Bosnia.
On the side of social and economic indicators,
the situation is similarly bleak in both entities of
Bosnia. Unemployment in both entities stands above
40 percent with those who are working in the Fed-
eration gaining an average income of approx. 430
DM and approx. 300 DM in the Republika Srpska.
As has been noted by the ICG, 46 percent of the Fed-
eration population and 75 percent of the RS popula-
tion cannot afford the basic basket of goods and
foods, considered to be the minimum for a family of
four.
The consequence of the lack of progress in
interethnic confidence, distrust in institutions and
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economic and social decline has been the emigra-
tion (or the wish to do so) by a significant share of
the population. After the end of the war in Decem-
ber 1995 over 100,000 Bosnians left the country by
the end of 2000 according to official numbers
(approx. 2.6 percent of the population), with over 60
percent of the Bosnian youth wishing to leave the
country.
While these figures do not represent an ex-
ception in the region where both social and economic
indicators and the desire of citizens to leave their
country are comparably high, Bosnia represents a
country, which has been considerable Western in-
vestment and involvement in the past six years.
The experience of Bosnia in the past seven
years demonstrates that there is no recipe for inter-
national agencies, which would guarantee success
in reconstruction of society and re-building of trust.
It would be thus flawed to identify one 'solution' to
the dilemmas herein. Instead, a more effective policy
will have to address a number of the issues here. Most
importantly, intervention has to be limited and care-
ful as to not foster political and social dependency
on intervention. In an attempt to undermine extreme
nationalism, it also has to take into account the struc-
tural reasons, which lead to their rise, rather than
identifying nationalism as a self-standing phenom-
enon. In Bosnia, fear has been reduced, but trust is
yet to be built between its citizens.
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